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In the third part of the book, Linteau deals with the "garden city" phase of 
urban land development (pp. 185-86). A chapter (pp. 199-221) is devoted to the 
politique de grandeur which was really the outcome of the ideological commitment 
to "progress and prosperity" which impregnated the thinking of all North American 
developers of this period. Finally at the outset of World War I, Maisonneuve suc-
cumbed to the nation-wide economic crisis and found itself unable to meet its 
financial commitments, primarily due to an excessive debt burden flowing from this 
grandiose building period. 
The main thesis that Linteau develops is that, contrary to other conflicting 
statements, the French-Canadian landowner and developer was definitely not a 
conservative risk-avoiding entrepreneur; rather he was a major component of the 
urban and suburban development process in Quebec. He joined his land capital 
with industrial capital and by monopolizing the municipal decision-making process 
provided the principal driving force that brought about such spectacular growth. 
Linteau suggests that this mechanism is probably true of other Quebec cities during 
comparable periods of growth. 
In general, this volume presents a balanced treatment of the historical growth 
process of one major entity. of present-day Montreal. From a geographer's stand-
point it would have been interesting to have more information on the social segrega-
tion of urban space; but, apparently, for the given time-period detailed information 
was hard, if not impossible, to find. The book reads well and is extremely interest-
ing to anyone with an urban studies orientation. Some of the descriptive passages 
tend to be a little repetitive, but this is small criticism compared to the overall value 
of this work. 
* * * 
Peter M. FoGGIN 
Universite de Montreal 
E. A. WRIGLEY and R. S. SCHOFIELD. - The Population History of England 
1541-1871 . Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981. Pp: xv, 
779. 
The Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure has 
been assiduously working on the demographic history of England for almost twenty 
years. During that time they have reported on their progress in articles, collections 
of essays and the occasional short book. The volume under review represents the 
climax of their efforts, as well as that of several hundred local historians. It is the 
most authoritative account we are ever likely to have of what happened to 
England's population between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
In one respect the book confirms what historians have known for some time: 
that England's population rose just over sevenfold in those 330 years, from about 3 
million to 21.5 million. What is new is the refinement they bring to the figures, 
drawing to our attention that population did not increase by linear progression, and 
showing us exactly where in the curve the peaks and valleys occur. What is exciting 
about this dense and often difficult volume is the manner in which the authors use 
their findings to refashion our understanding of England's economic and social his-
tory. 
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The authors discern three main phases : I) from 1541 to 1656 when the popu-
lation almost doubled, growing at an average rate of over 0.5 percent annually; 2) 
from 1657 to 1740 when there was a virtual cessation of population growth; and 3) 
from 1741 when it resumed at an accelerating pace until the 1820s, after which time 
it tapered off for the balance of the nineteenth century. Growth was never steady: 
population increased as fast as 1.5 percent a year in the early nineteenth century, 
while it actually fell by 0.5 percent a year in the mid-seventeenth. The astonishing 
thing is that despite the periodic famines, plagues, and epidemics, which had largely 
disappeared by the eighteenth century, mortality, expressed as average life expec-
tancy , improved very little over three centuries. In the later sixteenth century it 
rose to over forty, then fell to less than thirty a hundred years later. Life expect-
ancy did not reach forty again until the 1830s. The dramatic increase in population 
that began around 1740 came about not because of declining mortality, but rising 
fertility. Thus , the argument of McKeown and others who have suggested that de-
clining mortality, due to improved nutrition and public health, brought about the 
population explosion, can no longer be supported. The birth rate, which rose to a 
historic peak of over 40 per I ,000 in the decade 1816-25, reflected a fall in the age at 
marriage and in the proportion who never married. This finding vindicates the 
shrewd insight of H. J. Habakkuk who twenty years ago advanced the hypothesis 
that marriage was the key to population in the eighteenth century. Increased nup-
tiality in turn reflected a long-term increase in real wages, i.e., an improved stan-
dard of living. 
However, changes in nuptiality and fertility lagged behind changes in the 
standard of living by about half a century. That apparently is how long it took 
people to realize collectively that a genuine change in economic circumstances had 
occurred, and to alter their "fertility strategy" accordingly. There is nothing deter-
ministic in this reconstruction of England' s demography. Far from being helplessly 
buffeted by the invisible hand of fate, people responded in a conscious and disci-
plined way to real changes in their standard ofliving. After real wages fell in the later 
sixteenth century, they reduced the size of their families, chiefly by marrying later. 
Surprisingly, later marriage did not bring in its train any increase in bastardy ; quite 
the reverse . By the 1650s (under Oliver Cromwell) social discipline was at its tight-
est , with the illegitimacy rate falling to an historic low of 1.5 percent. The theory 
that before the age of contraception family limitation can only have been accom-
plished by widespread resort to infanticide and induced abortion finds no support in 
this book. 
If this line of argument is correct Malthus has been refuted . The English 
population was not kept under control by the Malthusian "positive checks" of 
famine, plague, and epidemic . Indeed, the authors are able to demonstrate that poor 
harvests and high food prices had only a slight impact on aggregate mortality 
figures. Rather than suffering passively, people took their destiny into their own 
hands, and employed the "preventive check" of reduced fertility in order to adapt 
to poorer conditions. Adaptation of course took time, which explains why fertility 
often went on increasing when real wages were declining. Thus, they argue, the 
misery of the lower classes around the time of the Napoleonic wars was caused by 
the contemporary downturn in real wages combined with the continuing high fertil-
ity that was a response to the wage levels of over half a century before. 
At this stage the authors have joined the standard-of-living-in-the-industrial-
revolution debate. From the perspective of more than two hundred years of previ-
ous demographic history, they suggest that the immiseration of the lower classes in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was not so much the consequence 
of industrialization as of their inability to adapt quickly enough to the decline in 
real wages that set in after 1740 and lasted till after 1800. Furthermore, it was in the 
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nineteenth century that England experienced a genuine demographic revolution. 
Population growth no longer influenced food prices because agricultural production 
was able to keep pace with population increase, no matter how rapid. Secondly, the 
rise in real wages no longer produced an increase in nuptiality and fertility. In the 
1820s the birth rate embarked on a long-term decline which has continued with only 
minor interruptions from that day till this. 
This is only a bare outline of the book's main argument. There are also fas-
cinating explorations of the impact of temperature and rainfall, the changing age 
structure, migration, urbanization and disease. Methodologically, the first third of 
the book is a step-by-step explanation of how the authors developed "robust" final 
figures from a very imperfect source: the baptismal, marriage, and burial registers 
of four percent of the parishes of England. In order to derive population totals from 
the annual flow of vital events, they have pioneered a powerful and sophisticated 
technique that they label "aggregative back projection" . Using nineteenth-century 
censuses and the age structure and mortality levels revealed by them, they work 
backwards, assimilating the annual totals of births and deaths supplied by the parish 
registers to arrive at population totals reaching back to 1541. A forbiddingly difficult 
appendix describes the mathematical tools that are deployed in this exercise. 
This impressive and mainly convincing reconstruction of England's popula-
tion history has not been achieved without difficulty. It is a pity that no London 
parishes were included among the 404 that are the foundation of the study. Roger 
Finlay's Population and Metropolis (1981), which demonstrates that valuable re-
sults can be obtained from London parish registers, was begun too late to be of use 
to the authors. However, the steps taken to incorporate London figures into the 
national data are convincing, and highlight the terrible mortality rate prevailing in 
the metropolis. Indeed, one of the book's valuable services is to confirm the view 
that until the end of the nineteenth century citie·s were much unhealthier places to 
live in than the country. London's death rate, for example, appears to have ex-
ceeded her birth rate until at least 1800. 
To determine the standard of living by comparing the Phelps-Brown-Hopkins 
indexes of wages and prices is a risky business. Not only are the data fragile, suffer-
ing from a number of gaps, and based on a very limited number of sources, they 
take no account of the fact that a large proportion of the English people lived par-
tially or wholly outside the money economy up to 1700. Of this the authors are 
painfully aware; nevertheless they base what is perhaps their most important argu-
ment on a comparison of changing fertility and changing real wages derived from 
Phelps, Brown and Hopkins. There was of course no alternative to this procedure 
except the unacceptably arduous one of constructing their own index. Even a new 
index would not have eliminated the problem of the people who made little or no 
use of money. Thus the authors are vulnerable to attack, and it is unlikely that the 
pessimist school in the standard-of-living-in-the-industrial-revolution debate will 
allow to escape unchallenged their assertion that the apparent decline in real wages 
between 1740 and 1800 was produced by the two-generation lag in fertility's re-
sponding to this decline. That it took a full sixty-five years before fertility followed 
the decline in real wages makes cine suspect that other factors may have contami-
nated the limpid clarity of the wages/fertility nexus. 
While the edifice of the book's argument is bold and clear, its architecture is 
complex and occasionally obscure. Crucial terms are sometimes left undefined 
(Gross Reproduction Rate, for example) because they are familiar to professional 
demographers. Finally, in view of the extensive discussion it has received in other 
quarters, one might have expected an explicit statement about the evident unimpor-
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tance of infanticide and induced abortion in England's demographic history before 
the late nineteenth century. 
These criticisms are not intended to detract from what is by any standard a 
triumphant achievement. Here is a book that no one interested in the social history 
of western Europe can ignore. It would be a signal service to students if the authors 
could produce an abridged paperback version, supplemented by a glossary defining 
the key technical terms. 
* * * 
Ian GENTLES 
Glendon College, York University 
CLAUS-PETER CLASEN. -Die Augsburger Weber: Leistungen und Krisen des 
Textilgewerbes um /600. Augsburg: Verlag Hieronymus Miihlberger, 1981. Pp. 460. 
The weavers of Augsburg helped make their city the principal textile pro-
ducer in Central Europe from the mid-sixteenth to the mid-seventeenth century. 
Yet weaving went hand in hand with poverty, a fact ably demonstrated in this 
detailed study of the industry at the high point of its productive capacity and inter-
national fame. Explanation of what he considers an ironic social situation thus be-
comes one major theme for the author, Claus-Peter Clasen, who is known best for 
several articles and two books on the history of Anabaptism. That earlier topic 
brought him quite naturally to the Augsburg City Archives, where he was impressed 
with the rich collection of sources for an examination of the city's population and 
social structure. Despite their numerical and general economic importance in the 
textile centre, however, the Augsburg weavers had scarcely been touched by mod-
em researchers. Hence, Clasen decided to begin what is presumably an even larger 
project with this monograph on the weavers. 
The author has given us as concrete and detailed an analysis of the Augsburg 
weaving trade as any specialist in early modern economic, industrial, or German 
urban history would ever desire. There are lacunae in every piece of research, of 
course, but Clasen inspires confidence that he has unearthed everything the docu-
ments will allow us to know about his subject. The book is based almost exclusively 
on primary sources and represents a kind of assiduous archival research rather 
uncommon among historians on this side of the Atlantic . But it is also written so 
closely to its sources and focussed so exclusively on the weavers, without much 
concern for placing their situation in the broader framework of Augsburg history, let 
alone of comparative urban or industrial developments in Central Europe, that 
Clasen's work faces the prospect of being used only by determined specialists who 
already know much about Augsburg or about premodern industry and wish to draw 
on this case study for particular information useful for their own purposes. Such a 
limited audience would be understandable but unfortunate, because the patient 
reader of this dense, four-hundred-sixty-page volume - even the impatient user 
only of its excellent indices - can discover a mine of information, both descriptive 
and analytical, about the lives of ordinary working people in an early modern city. 
Clasen discusses a whole range of topics related to his weavers. Not only 
does he address the old issue of timing local economic decline in the seventeenth 
century and conclude that an initial faltering in the second decade left the fustian 
industry remarkably strong until its virtual collapse in the 1630s. He examines family 
